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Abstract
We study the strategic implications that arise from adding one extra option to the miners
participating in the bitcoin protocol. We propose that when adding a block, miners also
have the ability to pay forward an amount to be collected by the first miner who successfully
extends their branch, giving them the power to influence the incentives for mining. We
formulate a stochastic game for the study of such incentives and show that with this added
option, smaller miners can guarantee that the best response of even substantially more
powerful miners is to follow the expected behavior intended by the protocol designer.
1 Introduction
Bitcoin, currently the most-widely used cryptocurrency, was introduced in a 2009 white pa-
per [12] by the mysterious Satoshi Nakamoto as a form of decentralized, distributed, peer-to-
peer digital currency. The backbone of the bitcoin protocol is the blockchain, a distributed
ledger that (ideally) takes the form of a chain where bitcoin transactions are stored into blocks.
Blocks are created by special nodes of the bitcoin network called miners that: (i) collect and
validate the set of transactions to be included in a block and (ii) solve a crypto-puzzle (the
so-called proof of work) that cryptographically links the newly created (mined) block to the
tail of the existing blockchain. The main purpose of the blockchain is to solve the problem of
distributed consensus, where the consensus to be obtained is on the history (and relative order)
of the bitcoin transactions.
Since mining new blocks is a computationally intensive (and expensive) task, miners need
a reward scheme to keep mining blocks. Bitcoin has two main reward schemes for miners: (i)
transaction fees, that are left by bitcoin users on a voluntary basis (and hence vary in frequency
and size) and coinbase (or block) rewards, which are constituted by a fixed set amount (currently
12.5-B) of newly minted bitcoins. Coinbase rewards are the only way by which bitcoins can ever
be created, and the protocol specifies that (to avoid inflation) coinbase rewards be decreasing
over time, until the limit of 21 million bitcoins are created: at that point the only incentive
scheme left for miners will be transaction fees. Currently, most of the rewards for mining a
block are coinbase.
In a distributed setting populated by selfish miners, however, the blockchain will hardly
be a chain at all, but rather a tree. For instance, network delays may lead miners to add
newly mined blocks to different blocks that they believed to be the tail of the chain. For this
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reason, newly mined blocks are not part of the consensus until sufficient time has passed since
their creation (i.e., d levels of other blocks are added to the blockchain – currently d = 100),
and block rewards become available to miners only then. Worse still, even though the bitcoin
protocol prescribes that miners should mine from the last known block in the chain (the so-called
Frontier strategy), self-interested miners may try to create a fork by intentionally adding a
sequence of blocks (a branch) constituting a parallel history of the transactions, in an attempt
to reap more block rewards or to double-spend bitcoins (once per each branch of the fork).
It should be clear from now that the bitcoin protocol is rife with game-theoretic issues.
Nakamoto [12] analyzed in a simple model, providing rough estimates showing that if a large
majority of miners follow Frontier, then their chain will be the longest and contain the agreed
upon history.
Since Nakamoto’s paper, there has been significant work about the strategies of miners,
mainly under the assumption that the reward per block is fixed (see for example [5, 16, 8]). In
particular, these mining games have been systematically evaluated through the lens of game-
theory by Kiayias et al. [8]. They considered mining games in which miners can influence the
blockchain in two ways: by strategically choosing to mine at different branches in an attempt
to overtake the longest branch and by withholding their mined blocks and releasing them at the
right time, wasting everyone else’s computational power. In [16, 8], it was shown by both formal
proofs and simulations that the Nakamoto protocol is stable when no miner has computation
power more than 0.33 of the total. Furthermore, it was also shown that when the miners do
not withhold blocks, the protocol is stable if no miner has computation power more than 0.42.
This raises the issue of fairness and compliance in the bitcoin protocol. By deviating from
the protocol and mining strategically, large miners could affect the network in two ways. By
increasing their own rewards disproportionately to their computational power they limit the
mining rewards claimed by smaller miners, which is unfair. Also, their constant forking in
an attempt to add more blocks upsets the protocol and can cause delays, as well as negate
transactions that have been already processed.
In this work, we propose a slight modification to the protocol whereby miners can entice
other miners to mine at their block by adding a pay-forward amount. This pay-forward amount
is collected by the miner of the next block, thus providing incentives to other miners to try to
extend the tree from this particular branch. When we extend the available strategies for the
miners by adding the ability to pay-forward, we reclaim some stability by ensuring that the
attacking (computationally powerful) miner is incentivized to follow the protocol, even if he
still reaps more than his fair share of rewards.
The main technical contribution is the study of mining games in which the strategies are
extended by pay-forward. We show that with this extension, the stability of the protocol
increases significantly: the computational power needed by a dishonest miner to disrupt the
blockchain is substantially higher. This shows an interesting trade-off for small miners: on one
hand they lose the pay-forward amount but on the other hand, they provide the right incentives
to large miners to play Frontier and thus secure that their block will end up in the longest
chain.
1.1 Our Results
We consider two types of stochastic games, whose states are rooted trees. The game is played
in discrete time-steps. At the beginning of each time-step, every miner chooses a block and
tries to mine from it. Each player i has probability pi to mine a new block, proportional to his
computational power. In the end, the new block may be added to the blockchain or kept hidden
and released later. After many rounds of playing, the utility of each player is the fraction of
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bitcoins he owns (from block and pay-forward rewards) over the total value that has been mined
in the longest chain.
Let p be the computational power of the strongest player, called Miner 1. If p is large enough,
his best response, given that everyone else is playing Frontier, may be a different strategy.
We find thresholds on p and w, the pay forward amount of every other player, to guarantee that
mining at the end of the longest chain is a best response for Miner 1. As in [8], we consider
two variants. In the immediate release case, any mined block has to be added to the blockchain
immediately for other players to use. In this case, without pay forward rewards, it was proven
in [8] that Frontier is a best response for Miner 1 for p < h, where 0.361 ≤ h ≤ 0.455.
Experimentally, they also showed that there is always a deviating strategy for h ≈ 0.42. In the
strategic release case, the newly mined blocks are public knowledge, but can only be used by
other players when their creators decide to release them. As before, it was shown in [8] that
there is a threshold hˆ ≥ 0.308 (experimentally shown to be approximately 0.33 [8, 16]) such
that p < hˆ leads to Frontier as a best response for Miner 1.
We improve these thresholds to h = 0.5 and hˆ ≥ 0.344 by showing that there exists some
w (as a function of p) that guarantees Miner 1’s best response is to play Frontier when all
remaining miners play Frontier and pay forward w. In addition, we experimentally show that
for h ≤ 0.44 that outcome is also a pure Nash equilibrium for the immediate release case, while
for the strategic release case we find that hˆ ≈ 0.38. We also devise a linear program to calculate
the minimum value of w for any given p.
1.2 Related Work
Bitcoin, originally introduced by Nakamoto in [12] and followed by several cryptocurrencies,
such as Litecoin, Ethereum and Ripple, initiated the research on blockchains. Nakamoto’s orig-
inal paper analyses double spending attacks while Rosenfeld provides a more detailed analysis
[15]. Bonneau et al. [2] and Tschorsch and Scheuermann [20] provided extensive surveys of the
research and challenges in cryptocurrencies.
Kroll et al. [10] was one the first papers to consider the economics of Bitcoin mining,
assuming that participants behave according to their incentives. Eyal and Sirer [7] showed
that the security of bitcoin is not guaranteed by a majority of honest miners as was previously
assumed. They gave a specific mining strategy and argued that a pool of miners, with at least
a 1/3 of the total processing power, can get extra profit regardless of the block propagation
characteristics of the network. With sufficiently favorable block propagation, this threshold of
processing power falls to 0. Extending this, Sapirshtein et al. [16] provided systematic analysis
of the space of selfish mining strategies based on computational results.
A similar approach was taken by Kiayias et al. [8] who provided a framework for studying
the strategic considerations made by Bitcoin miners. They formulated two abstract stochastic
games and proved rigorous bounds on the threshold of computational power below which the
honest strategy is a Nash Equilibrium. Carlsten et al. [3] extended the previous approaches by
investigating mining games when the reward for miners varies and comes mainly from transac-
tion fees. They observed that the random block arrival times lead to high variance in rewards
and they considered strategies that lead to instability. They showed via simulation that an
equilibrium exists, but it has the counter intuitive and undesirable effect of a growing backlog
of unprocessed transactions.
Several other studies examine possible attacks on the protocol and suggest adaptations to
ensure its security. Rosenfeld [14] and Courtois and Bahack [4] discuss pool mining attacks.
Eyal [5] introduces an attack in which mining pools infiltrate one another resulting in a pool
game. Lewenberg et al. [11] also provide a game theoretic analysis of pool mining. Babaioff et
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al. [1] consider Sybil attacks on the network and propose a reward scheme to prevent miners
from hiding transactions in competition with other miners.
There is also considerable work on the performance and scalability of blockchain inspired
networks. Sompolinsky and Zohar’s [18] Greedy-Heaviest-Observed-Sub-Tree rule is an alter-
native consensus mechanism. Eyal [6] proposes Bitcoin-NG which increases the throughput of
Bitcoin. Poon and Dryja’s Lightning Network [13] scales via off-chain transactions and hashed
commitments. Sompolinsky and Zohar’s PHANTOM [19] achieves near unlimited transaction
throughput. SPECTRE [17], by Sompolinsky et al, fully orders the transactions in blocks using
recursive elections and can used in combination with PHANTOM. Kiayias et al. developed
Ouroboros[9], a proof of stake network with provable security, utilising a secure multi-party
coin flipping protocol.
2 Model and Notation
The model contains subtleties in the abstractions that at first glance might be overlooked by
readers who are too familiar with the bitcoin protocol. We do our best to point out any of those
instances, but be especially vigilant when reading about the way payoffs are calculated.
The bitcoin mining game with pay forward is an abstraction of the actual protocol, simplified
in a way that can only accentuate its game theoretic issues (i.e. negative results hold a fortiori
for the actual protocol) while being open to rigorous analysis. The parameters of the game are:
1. the number n of miners (or players).
2. the probabilities p1, . . . , pn, representing the hash power of each miner, which is the prob-
ability that they solve the crypto-puzzle. They are proportional to the computational
power of each miner and such that: pi ≥ 0 for each i and
∑n
i=1 pi = 1.
3. the depth d after which mined blocks are ‘paid’, i.e. their coinbase becomes usable by the
respective miner. Without loss of generality we mostly consider d = ∞ which gives the
attacker extra power.
We assume that each block has a fixed reward, which by appropriate scaling is equal to 1.
This is reasonable, as the large majority of rewards come from the fixed coinbase rewards. The
fluctuating transaction fees (while not insignificant) are still comparatively small.
During the execution of the protocol, miners add their blocks to the blockchain one at a
time1. Their goal is to maximize the fraction of their blocks on the longest branch of the
blockchain, as the longest branch represents the consensus and all other branches are pruned
and the computational power spent for their creation is wasted. This does not mean that all
the miners try to extend the longest branch at every time step, because some times they might
benefit by either adding a block to a shorter branch or withholding it for later.
Definition 1. A public state is a rooted tree. Every node is labelled by one of the players
and the amount of money he pays-forward. The nodes represent mined blocks and the label
indicates the player who mined the block. The pay-forward amount is collected by the next
miner in the longest branch. Every level of the tree has at most one node labelled i because
there is no reason for a player to mine twice the same level.
1 Due to the decentralized nature of bitcoin, it is possible for more than one miners to mine a block simulta-
neously. This event does occur by chance, but it is very rare and it is not something a miner can plan for. For
this reason, we assume that exactly one block is mined at every step, but most of our analysis could be easily
extended to the case in which each miner succeeds with probability pi independently.
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A private state of player i is similar to the public state except it may contain more nodes
called private nodes and labelled by i. The public tree is a subtree of the private tree and has
the same root.
The incomplete information case (where the pi’s or private states are unknown) is signifi-
cantly more complicated. In this work we only consider the full information case where even
the private states are common knowledge (but only become part of the public state when their
respective miners add them). We consider two variants:
Immediate-release model Every mined block is added to the public tree immediately.
Strategic-release model Mined blocks can be withheld: every miner is aware of their exis-
tence, but they can only mine from them once they are added to the public tree.
The second model has no counterpart in practice, but it serves as an intermediate step between
the full and incomplete information models and allows us to study issues around strategic release
of blocks. If a strategy is not dominant in this model it cannot be dominant in the incomplete
information setting.
Definition 2 (Strategy). The strategy of miner i can be fully characterized by three functions
µi, ri,PFi:
• the mining function µi selects a block of the public state to mine from
• the release function ri which is the rooted tree he releases to the public. It is a subtree of
his private state that contains the public state.
• the pay-forward function PFi which is the amount of money to be left for the next miner.
Both functions depend on the public and private states of every player.
The original suggested strategy in [12] is Frontier.
Definition 3 (Frontier). A miner follows strategy Frontier if he releases mined blocks
immediately, always mines at the deepest node in the blockchain and pays forward 0 -B.
In the following, we refer to Frontier(w) as the strategy that mines and releases like
Frontier but always pays forward w.
The game is played in phases. At each phase exactly one miner will mine a block. Then he
will choose if he wants to release it, which may trigger a cascade of releases from other players.
Eventually, once no one else wants to release anything the public knowledge is updated and the
next phase begins. Even if no one releases a block, miners know when the phase ends since
everything is public knowledge.
To incentivise miners to mine new blocks, payments are necessary. When a block is added,
it is unclear if it is going to remain on the longest branch permanently. To remedy this,
blocks are paid for only after their branch is increased by d blocks, after which time it is safe
to assume it will stay in the longest branch. Blocks are paid through coinbase, transaction
fees and pay-forward. Currently, coinbase rewards (which can be claimed at d = 100) far
outweigh transaction fees. However, by design Bitcoin will eventually do away with coinbase
rewards to limit inflation, at which point only transaction fees will remain, leading to potential
instability [3]. We only consider coinbase rewards in this work. For game theoretic analysis we
rigorously define payments:
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Definition 4 (Payments). For some nodes of the tree, the miners who discovered them will get
a payment (coinbase rewards are normalized to 1). The payments comply with the following
rules:
• the blocks that receive a payment must form a path from the root. This immediately adds
the restriction that at every level of the tree exactly one node receives payment.
• among the blocks of a single level that satisfy the above condition, the first one which
succeeds in having a descendant d generations later receives payment.
Since only one block per level is paid for and they form the longest branch, the utility of a miner
in the long run is defined as the fraction of pay-forward and coinbase rewards he obtained minus
the pay-forward he paid in that branch, over it’s length.
When a block is paid for, strategic miners will ignore any branch that starts at an earlier
node. This limits the shape of the public state to a long path (the trunk) with ignored stale
branches dangling from it. Only at the end of the trunk we may find multiple active branches,
competing to reach length d and render the others stale. We will also consider the case where
d =∞. Here there is the possibility that two competing branches will go on forever, but since
one of them will have less computational power, a case of gamblers ruin makes this impossible.
3 Immediate Release
In this section we show that if Frontier(w) (for some value of w) is followed by all miners
but one, the remaining miner’s best response is Frontier, provided his hash power is p < 0.5.
Since only one miner might deviate, we can view this situation as Miner 1 being the potentially
deviant large miner with hash power p < 0.5 and Miner 2 all small miners combined into one,
which we call the honest miners, since they follow the same strategy.
In essence, every honest player mines at the deepest node and always pays forward w. This
amount propagates across the small miners forming Miner 2 but Miner 1 can claim it for himself,
leading to an interesting stochastic game where Miner 1 is incentivise to mine the longest chain,
since the rewards don’t accumulate.
The blockchain itself is a rooted tree, but after pruning abandoned branches we are left with
one long, undisputed, main path followed by two branches of length a and b, mined by Miner
1 and Miner 2 respectively. Therefore, the possible states of the game have the form (a, b, c),
where a ≤ b+1 since Miner 2 always mines the longest branch (except briefly, right when Miner
1’s branch overtakes the longest) and c is either 0 or 1, to indicate whether the last block before
the fork contained a pay forward reward.
1 2 2 1 2
2
1 1 1
2 2 2 2
Trunk
a = 3
b = 5
Figure 1: A typical state tree. The trunk represents the blocks whose rewards have already been collected. The
current state (3, 5, 1) of the game is represented by the blocks mined by Miner 1 and Miner 2 and c = 1 because
Miner 2 controls the block before the fork.
6
The set of states (a, b, c) can be partitioned as follows:
1. Winning states: the set W of states where Miner 2 capitulates and starts mining from
the tip of Miner 1’s branch. This happens exactly when a = b + 1, therefore W =
{(b + 1, b, c) | b ≥ 0 and c ∈ {0, 1}}. After Miner 1 overtakes, the new state of the game
is (0, 0, 0) since they both mine at the same point.
2. Capitulation states: the set C of states where Miner 1 capitulates, abandons his branch
and mines from a block of Miner 2’s branch, thus moving the game to state (0, s, 1) for
some s s.t. 0 ≤ s < b. We say that Miner 1 capitulates at (a, b, c) and to (0, s, 1). Clearly,
after capitulating there would be a pay forward reward available.
3. Mining states: the set M of states where Miner 1 and Miner 2 mine their respective
branches.
Miner 1 can capitulate to any state (0, s, 1) and will always choose the one that maximizes his
payoff. Since he is rational, when capitulating from state (a, b, c) he would only go to states
(0, s, 1) with s < b, otherwise he would be undercutting his own tentative branch. The strat-
egy Frontier has M = {(0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1)}, C = {(0, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1)} and always capitulates to
(0, 0, 1).
Let gk(a, b, c) denote the optimal expected gain of Miner 1 starting from state (a, b, c) when
the longest chain is extended by k levels. Knowing Miner 1 will never pay-forward, we can
recursively define:
gk(a, b, c) =


gk−1(0, 0, 0) + a+ w · c if a = b+ 1
max
{
maxs=0,...,b−1 gk(0, s, 1)
pgk(a+ 1, b, c) + (1− p)gk−1(a, b+ 1, c)
. (1)
The first line represents Miner 2 capitulating to Miner 1’s chain. The second line containing
the max has two cases. In the first case, Miner 1 capitulates to the optimal point within Miner
2’s chain. In the second, they both mine and extend their chains with probability p and (1− p)
respectively. Notice that the first term is pgk(a+1, b, c) and not pgk−1(a+1, b, c). Since a < b+1,
if Miner 1 adds a block the deepest level of the blockchain does not change, thus k remains the
same.
Clearly, Miner 1 eventually will add some block to the chain and the game will restart at
state (0, 0, 0). Therefore, we expect that the initial state (a, b, c) has no effect asymptotically.
We define the expected gain per level g⋆ as:
g⋆ = lim
k→∞
gk(a, b, c)
k
. (2)
We can decompose g⋆ into two separate quantities:
g⋆ = qM + qPF · w, (3)
where qM is the expected fraction of blocks he mined and qPF the expected fraction of blocks
mined and containing pay forward rewards.
Lemma 1. If Miner 1 follows Frontier, we have qM = p and qPF = p(1− p).
Proof. If Miner 1 is honest then the probability that he mined any arbitrary block is p. That
block also contains pay forward rewards if the one that immediately preceded it was mined by
Miner 2, which occurs with probability p(1− p).
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We are ready to state the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 1. For every p < 0.5, there exists w ≥ 0 large enough so that if every miner but one
follows Frontier(w), the best response of the remaining miner with hash power p is Frontier.
Proof. We will show that qPF attained by Frontier is at least as large as that of any optimal
strategy, and in particular it is larger for 0 < p < 0.5.
Lemma 2. If Frontier is not the optimal strategy and 0 < p < 0.5, we have that p(1 − p) >
qPF. For p = 0 or p = 0.5 we have equality.
Proof. Assuming Frontier is not an optimal strategy, we consider different cases, depending
on the actions of the optimal strategy starting from state (0, 1, c).
Clearly, we have that gk(0, 1, 1) ≥ gk(0, 1, 0) for all k. To see this, consider what happens
if we apply exactly the same sequence of actions starting from (0, 1, 0) and from (0, 1, 1). As
the only difference between the two states is the initial pay forward amount, if we start from
(0, 1, 1) the reward will be the higher (in expectation) by some fraction of w. Therefore, if the
optimal strategy capitulates at (0, 1, 1) it must also capitulate at (0, 1, 0). This is exemplified
in Figure 2, where blocks with a red outline represent those mined by the optimal strategy, and
red arrows show how the action of the optimal strategy in one case implies the same action in
the other.
1 2 1
2
1 2 2
2
Figure 2: Mining like Frontier
But in this case, the optimal strategy capitulates at exactly the same states as Frontier,
as shown in Figure 2. Since the blockchain starts empty, at (0, 0, 0) this strategy would behave
exactly the same as Frontier and would therefore not be optimal.
1 2 1
2
1 2 2
2
Figure 3: Case 1
In Case 1 (shown in Figure 3), we assume that the optimal strategy mines at (0, 1, 0). As
before, since (0, 1, 1) is a more beneficial state it would mine from there as well. We can therefore
assume that the optimal strategy always capitulates to states (0, s, 1) with s ≥ 1. Blocks are
permanently added to the blockchain only after a capitulation. Given that, in order to compute
qPF for Miner 1, we construct the Markov chain shown in Figure 4, with states (0, 0, 0) and
(0, s, 1) indicating that Miner 2 or Miner 1 capitulated respectively. Each transition is labelled
with a pair where the first element is the transition probability, whereas the second element is
the minimum number of blocks added to the chain when the transition occurs.
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(0,0,0) (0, s, 1)
(1− p)α, 1
β, 2
(1− p)(1− α), 2
p, 1
1− β, 1
Figure 4: Case 1 Markov chain
Starting from (0, 0, 0), with probability p Miner 1 adds a block and the game restarts. With
probability 1− p we move to state (0, 1, 0) and the optimal strategy has probability α of losing
the race and capitulating to some state (0, s, 1). From there, the optimal strategy has probability
β of winning and returning to (0, 0, 0).
As qPF is an asymptotic quantity, we are interested in the fraction of pay forward rewards
per block mined at the stationary distribution. Let π be the stationary probability of state
(0, s, 1). Then:
π =
α− α · p
α− α · p+ β
(4)
In the actual game, multiple blocks are potentially mined in each edge transition, and only
the first block might claim a pay forward reward. On every transition at least one block
is permanently added, except from (0, s, 1) to (0, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 0) to itself through transition
(1 − p)(1 − α). In these cases at least two blocks are added, since Miner 1 must mine at least
two blocks to be ahead of Miner 2. From (0, s, 1) to (0, 0, 0) is the only transition where Miner
1 wins a block containing pay forward. Dividing the blocks with pay-forward over the total
amount mined at the stationary distribution:
qPF ≤
πβ
(1− π)(2(1 − α)(1 − p) + α(1 − p) + p) + π(2β + 1− β)
(5)
We now need to set the parameters α and β optimally to maximize the upper bound on qPF.
We take the derivative of the upper bound of qPF with respect to α and β to get:
dqPF
dα
=
β2(2− p)(1− p)
(α(p − 1) + β(p− 2))2
≥ 0 (6)
and
dqPF
dβ
=
α2(1− p)2
(α(p − 1) + β(p − 2))2
≥ 0. (7)
From [8, Lemma 1], we know that the probability that Miner 1 reaches a winning state starting
from (a, b) is at most (p/(1− p))(b−a+1). Therefore, the optimal strategy must have
α ≤ 1 and β ≤
(
p
1− p
)s+1
≤
(
p
1− p
)2
(8)
Since qPF is an increasing function of α, β, the upper bound is obtained by setting them to
their highest possible value, leading to:
qPF ≤
(1− p)p2
1− (1− p)p(3− 2p)
. (9)
Compared to the honest outcome p(1− p), we have:
p(1− p)−
(1− p)p2
1− (1 − p)p(3− 2p)
=
(1− p)p(1− 2p)
1− (1− p)p(3− 2p)
≥ 0, (10)
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with equality obtained only for p = 0 and p = 0.5. We also plot this result at the end of the
proof.
In the last case, the optimal strategy capitulates at (0, 1, 0) but mines at (0, 1, 1).
(0,0,0) (0,0,1)
(0,s,1)
(1− p), 1
p, 1
p, 1
1− p, 0


α(1− p)2, 4
2βp(1− p), 3
p2, 2
(1− p)2(1− α) + 2p(1− p)(1− β), 1
Figure 5: Case 2 Markov chain
The Markov chain in this case (Figure 5) is trickier. As before each state represents a
capitulation: (0, 0, 0) for Miner 2 and (0, 0, 1), (0, s, 1) with s ≥ 1 for Miner 1. However, the
transition indicated with the red arrow is not a capitulation: it is merely a move to a state that
Miner 1 could also capitulate to. To more accurately model the transitions of state (0, s, 1), we
consider multiple moves ahead. Specifically, three outcomes could happen before the optimal
strategy considers capitulating. With probability p2, Miner 1 could add two blocks and move to
(0, 0, 0). Miner 2 could also add two blocks and move to (0, s+ 2, 1), with probability (1− p)2.
Then, Miner 1 wins with probability α. Finally, Miner 1 and Miner 2 could both add one block
leading to (1, s+1, 1) with probability 2p(1− p). From there, Miner 1 wins with probability β.
Carefully adjusting for the more complicated transitions, the same analysis as before holds.
For both cases, we plot the difference p(1− p)− qPF in Figure 6.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
p
p
(1
−
p
)
−
q P
F
Figure 6: Advantage of Frontier in collecting qPF for Case 1 (blue) and Case 2 (red)
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Therefore, by (3) and Lemma 1 we have that
g⋆ = qM + qPF · w ≤ p+ (1− p) · w ⇒ w ≥
qM − p
(1− p)− qPF
and since (1 − p) > qPF for 0 < p < 0.5 there must be some value of w large enough to make
Frontier the best response.
Unfortunately, this result is not enough to calculate w. Giving crude upper bounds on qM
or qPF independently is not too hard, we can use [8, Lemma 1] from example. However, because
the trade-off between the two is hard to establish and the actual blockchain does not use d =∞,
it is more useful to develop an algorithm that finds the minimum w required for a specific d, to
any degree of accuracy.
3.1 Calculating the optimal w for finite d
In reality, the values of w needed are not too large. We could attempt to find the minimum w
necessary by computing gk(0, 0, 0)/k for large values of k and comparing with p + p(1 − p)w,
but a naive implementation would take O(k3) time. To simplify this search we can define a
potential as in [8]
φ(a, b, c) = lim
k→∞
gk(a, b, c) − k · g
⋆, (11)
that captures the advantage of Miner 1 at different states. This quantity is bounded, because
irrespective of the initial state (a, b, c) the game repeats: in particular, when Miner 1 gets ahead
of Miner 2 they both restart at state (0, 0, 0). Therefore, the gain per k asymptotically converges
to g⋆ and φ is well defined. Following recurrence (1), we have:
φ(a, b, c) =


φ(0, 0, 0) + a+ c · w − g⋆ if a = b+ 1
max


maxs=0,...,b−1 φ(0, s, 1)
p · φ(a+ 1, b, c)
+(1− p) · (φ(a, b + 1, c) − g⋆)
, (12)
where we set φ(0, 0, 0) = 0. Finding a φ that satisfies these constraints is even harder. However,
if we truncate the game at depth d, it becomes more feasible through linear programming.
Notice that (12) (which holds for d = ∞) does not explicitly define the value of φ(a, b, c): the
recursion is unbounded. By truncating the game at d we limit the available states to a, b ≤ d.
Specifically, Miner 1 has to capitulate when b = d.
The exact value of d has a small effect on the game. In particular, Miner 1 has more options
as d increases, since he does not have to capitulate early. Therefore, the minimum w needed
for compliance is a slightly increasing function of d. The effect of this is quite muted however;
the probability of having two branches with length greater than d, without Miner 1 winning or
capitulating, decreases exponentially in d. In this section we select d = 8, as it is large enough
to show the trend, but not too large to render the LP computationally infeasible.
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Relaxing the two maxes by inequalities, we get the following LP:
minimize g + 1
D
d∑
a=0
d∑
b=0
1∑
c=0
φ(a, b, c)
subject to
φ(b+ 1, b, c) ≥ φ(0, 0, 0) + b+ 1 + c · w − g
for b < d, c ≤ 1
φ(a, b, c) ≥ φ(0, s, 1)
for a ≤ b < d, s < b, c ≤ 1
φ(a, b, c) ≥ p · φ(a+ 1, b, c) + (1− p)(φ(a, b + 1, c) − g)
for a ≤ b < d, c ≤ 1
,
where φ(a, b, c) ≥ 0 and D ≫ d2 is a normalizing factor to keep the sum of states insignificant
compared to g. The constraints are straightforward enough, but the objective is a minimization,
which might appear odd at first. The second term of the sum is only there to ensure that feasible
solutions only contain potential functions φ that tightly satisfy (12). Since many states could
be unreachable (for example, if w is high enough so that Miner 1 plays Frontier, the only
mining states would be (0, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1)), their exact value does not affect g and we need
this ’extra’ term to keep them in check, just to bias the LP towards certain feasible solutions.
We minimize g to use the following lemma:
Lemma 3. For any g, φ pair satisfying (12) we have:
gk(a, b, c) ≤ φ(a, b, c) + k · g.
Proof. We use induction on k. Clearly, for k = 0 we have g0(a, b, c) = 0 ≤ φ(a, b, c). For fixed k
we do strong induction on b and backwards induction on a. Starting with b = 0, we begin the
induction on a = b+ 1:
gk(1, 0, c) = gk−1(0, 0, 0) + 1 + c · w
≤ φ(0, 0, 0) + (k − 1)g + 1 + c · w
= φ(0, 0, 0) + 1 + c · w − g + k · g
= φ(1, 0, c) + k · g
and
gk(0, 0, c) = p · gk(1, 0, c) + (1− p)gk−1(0, 1, c)
≤ p(φ(1, 0, c) + k · g) + (1− p)(φ(0, 1, c) + (k − 1)g)
= p · φ(1, 0, c) + (1− p)(φ(0, 1, c) − g) + k · g
= φ(0, 0, c) + k · g.
For b > 0 the proof works the same, starting from gk(b + 1, b, c) as the base case for a. For
a < b+ 1:
gk(a, b, c) = max
{
maxs=0,...,b−1 gk(0, s, 1)
pgk(a+ 1, b, c) + (1− p)gk−1(a, b+ 1, c)
≤ max


maxs=0,...,b−1 φ(0, s, 1) + kg
p · (φ(a+ 1, b, c) + kg)
+(1− p)(φ(a, b + 1, c) + (k − 1)g)
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Figure 7: Minimum w for the immediate release case.
= k · g +max


maxs=0,...,b−1 φ(0, s, 1)
p · φ(a+ 1, b, c)
+(1− p)(φ(a, b+ 1, c) − g)
= φ(a, b, c) + kg,
where strong induction was used for the capitulation case.
Using this lemma, we can find the minimum value of w that leads to Frontier being a
best response for different values of p by using binary search on w, checking that the φ produced
from the LP satisfies (12) and that g = p+ p(1− p)w. By the definition of g⋆:
g⋆ = lim
k→∞
gk(a, b, c)
k
≤ lim
k→∞
φ(a, b, c) + k · g
k
= p+ p(1− p)w,
For d = 8, we obtain the graph in Figure 7.
It is not a mistake that w < 1 for p = 0.5. The reason is that d is finite. For d = ∞, the
strategic miner with p ≥ 0.5 never has a reason to capitulate, no matter w: the probability that
his branch eventually overtakes the honest one is always quite high. However, the probability
that he will win the race within d steps is much smaller, leading to this result.
If not all honest miners are required to pay forward exactly w, they can share the costs.
In particular, one strategy which also makes Miner 1 comply with the protocol is for the first
honest miner after Miner 1 to pay forward w′ and every other honest miner to pay forward 2w′,
until Miner 1 adds a block and claims the reward for himself, where the process restarts. As
we can see from the Figure 7, although the total amount paid forward is larger (as 2w′ ≥ w),
the maximum contribution of any honest miner is w′ ≤ w. We can verify compliance is indeed
a best response for Miner 1 by using a slightly modified LP.
3.2 Pure Nash Equilibria for small miners
So far, we have only considered the best responses of Miner 1, given a society of honest, identical
miners and identified the minimum value w needed to ensure his compliance. The natural
question is to consider if this also a best response from the other miners. Clearly, when treated
as a group this is not their best response. If they do not pay forward any amount, Miner 1
would have an average gain of g′ ≥ p, by mining strategically. By paying forward enough, they
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need to increase his gain to g⋆ ≥ g′, as he can always employ strategic mining while they also
pay forward. Therefore, it is more costly for Miner 2 to pay forward w and ensure compliance
than to pay forward nothing and allow strategic mining.
We will argue however that under certain conditions paying forward can be a pure Nash
equilibrium, if Miner 2 consists of many small miners that are treated individually. A miner is
considered small if his chance of mining a block is negligible. Of course at every step some small
miner will mine a block with probability 1 − p. To see why paying forward is an equilibrium,
consider the options of a small miner at the exact moment when he mines a block: he can either
pay forward and guarantee it is included in the chain or keep everything for himself, but risk
getting undercut by Miner 1. Being a small miner, his payoff from mining another block in the
future is insignificant compared to the current reward at stake. Formally, the following strategy,
called StrictFrontier(w), is part of a PNE:
Definition 5 (StrictFrontier). Every miner (except Miner 1) pays forward w and mines at
the end of the longest chain that contains blocks with pay forward values either w or 0
Miner 1’s strategy is to mine at the frontier without paying forward, as before. Note, that
paying forward some value other than w or 0 cannot be a best response, since that block will
be ignored by the honest miners, who have the majority of the computational power2
Theorem 2. For d = 8 and any p ≤ 0.44, there exists w such that Miner 1 playing Frontier
and every other small miner playing StrictFrontier(w) is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof sketch. From the perspective of the small miner, he has two opportunities not to pay
forward: after another small miner or after Miner 1. We can modify the LP from Section 3.1 to
contain both these deviations by the small miner. Examining the tightness of the constraints,
we can identify the mining states of Miner 1. Specifically, for p ≤ 0.44, we observe that in
both cases, after the small miner adds his block without paying forward, Miner 1 immediately
forks the chain behind the small miner and starts mining in parallel. In particular, states
(0, 1, c), (1, 1, c), (1, 2, c) and (2, 2, c) become mining states and (0, 3, c), (1, 3, c), (2, 3, c) capitu-
lation states, for c ∈ {0, 1}. Essentially he mines while one step behind and capitulates if the
honest miners add 2 more blocks. Overall, he overtakes the honest branch with probability at
least p2 + (1− p)p3.
Therefore, the expected payoff of the small miner is at most (1 + w)(1 − p2 − (1 − p)p3),
compared to at least 1 − w which would have been his payoff had he paid forward w (since in
this case he would always keep his mined block). Plugging in the p,w pairs found in Figure 7
we verify that StrictFrontier(w) is indeed a best response.
It would be very interesting to see if there exists a strategy profile that is a PNE where
Miner 1 plays Frontier for 0.45 < p < 0.5. The analysis seems quite challenging and would
likely require different techniques to analyze the emerging stochastic game. Ideally, every small
miner comprising Miner 1 would use the same w, but it could be the case that better bounds
could be obtained if the pay forward amount use depends on the pay forward received from the
previous block.
4 Strategic Release
Similarly to the immediate release case, we identify the maximum hash power p such that if all
miners but one follow Frontier(w), the remaining miner’s best response is Frontier if his
2The reason StrictFrontier accepts pay forward of 0 is just to incentivize Miner 1 to cooperate. Without
it, every block would have the same pay forward, negating any effects this may have and reducing to the classic
bitcoin protocol.
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Figure 8: This tree represents state (3, 5, 3, 1). Miner 1 has already mined 5 blocks ahead of the fork, but has
only released 3 of them. Miner 2 knows this because the game is complete information. However, he cannot mine
there until Miner 1 releases his blocks. Miner 1 can strategically release blocks right when Miner 2’s branch is
about to become the main one, thus wasting Miner 1’s computational power.
hash power is less than p. As before, it is enough to consider a two player game where Miner 1
is the deviant miner with hash power p < 0.5 and Miner 2 represents all small miners, as they
follow the same strategy.
The blockchain retains its structure: it still contains a long trunk of blocks followed by two
branches, corresponding to the released blocks of Miner 1 and Miner 2. Since Miner 1 could
also have more unreleased blocks in his branch the state is now a quadruple (ar, a, b, c) where
a is the number of blocks in Miner 1’s branch, of which ar have been released, and b is the
number of blocks in Miner 2’s branch. Also, contrary to the immediate release case we can have
a > b+ 1.
Since Miner 2 follows the Frontier(w) strategy, he will capitulate if ar ≥ b+1 and continue
mining his branch for ar < b + 1. Therefore, without loss of generality we can assume that at
state (ar, a, b, c) if a < b+ 1 then ar = a and if a ≥ b+ 1 then ar = b, otherwise Miner 2 would
immediately capitulate and the game would continue at state (0, a − ar, 0, 0). Therefore, we
can encode the states of the mining game with strategic release by the triplet (a, b, c), where
ar = min(a, b).
As before, we need to recursively define the gain of Miner 1 after the longest branch is
extended by k levels. When a < b + 1, the actions of Miner 1 are exactly the same as in the
immediate release case: he can either capitulate to (0, s, 1) or mine. However, for a ≥ b+ 1 he
can release one more block to force Miner 2 to capitulate and continue at state (a− b− 1, 0, 0).
gˆk(a, b, c) = max


k + b+ c · w if a ≥ k + b
max


maxs=0,...,b−1 gˆk(0, s, 1)
pgˆk(a+ 1, b, c)
+(1− p)gˆk−1(a, b+ 1, c)
gˆk−1(a− b− 1, 0, 0)
+b+ 1 + c · w
(13)
where the last term applies for a ≥ b + 1. Equivalently, we can define gk(a, 0, c) = −∞ for all
k and a < 0. The first term is necessary, as without it the recurrence is ill-defined and Miner 1
can keep mining forever. Once he reached the horizon k he can safely release all his blocks. We
define the expected gain per level gˆ⋆ and potential φˆ as we did in (2) for the immediate release.
Note that the case where a = k + b does not appear, since φ is the asymptotic advantage as
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k →∞ and a, b are bounded.
φˆ(a, b, c) = max


maxs=0,...,b−1 φˆ(0, s, 1)
pφˆ(a+ 1, b, c) + (1− p)(φˆ(a, b+ 1, c) − gˆ⋆)
φˆ(a− b− 1, 0, 0) + b+ 1 + c · w − gˆ⋆
. (14)
Releasing blocks only causes Miner 2 to capitulate if a ≥ b + 1, so we set φ(a, 0, c) = −∞ for
a < 0. Before moving on, we need a useful inequality of the immediate release potential φ, to
use for bounding the advantage of some states relative to others.
Lemma 4. For nonnegative integers a, b and ℓ ∈ {0, 1} we have that:
φ(a+ ℓ, b+ ℓ, 1) ≤ φ(a, b, 0) + (ℓ+ w) ·
(
p
1− p
)b−a+1
. (15)
Proof. We first need to establish that for c ∈ {0, 1}
gk(a+ ℓ, b+ ℓ, c) ≤ gk(a, b, c) + ℓ ·
(
p
1− p
)b−a+1
(16)
and
gk(a+ ℓ, b+ ℓ, 1) ≤ gk(a, b, 0) + (ℓ+ w) ·
(
p
1− p
)b−a+1
. (17)
Suppose that from state (a, b) Miner 1 follows the same strategy as state (a + ℓ, b + ℓ). This
is possible, as winning or capitulating depends only on the difference b − a. Let g¯k(a, b, c) be
the gain from playing this suboptimal strategy and r¯(a, b) the probability of winning from state
(a, b). Clearly, we have:
gk(a, b, c) ≥ g¯k(a, b, c) = gk(a+ ℓ, b+ ℓ, c)− ℓ · r¯(a, b). (18)
Given that r¯(a, b) ≤ (p/(1 − p))b−a+1 from [8, Lemma 1] we get the first inequality.
For the second, let r(a, b) be the probability of winning from (a, b) with the optimal strategy.
As before:
gk(a, b, 1) = gk(a, b, 0) +w · r(a, b) ≤ gk(a, b, 0) + w ·
(
p
1− p
)b−a+1
, (19)
which we substitute in (16).
To complete the proof, we take limits in (16) and use the definition of φ.
In [8] it was shown that for p ≤ 0.361 Frontier is a best response, therefore (for w = 0)
there exists a φ such that for g⋆ = p (12) is satisfied, meaning that honest mining maximizes the
fraction of blocks added by Miner 1. By Lemma 2, increasing w can only strengthen this result,
therefore for p ≤ 0.361 and any w ≤ 1 there exists φ that satisfies (12) for g⋆ = p+ p(1− p)w.
Using this, we extend the potential to states (a, b, c) with a > b+ 1:
φ¯(a, b, c) =
{
φ(a, b, c) if a ≤ b+ 1
aλ+ bµ+ κ+ c · w otherwise
, (20)
where λ = (p−1)
2(1−pw)
1−2p , µ =
p(p−(p−1)2w)
2p−1 and κ =
(p−1)p(pw−1)
2p−1 . The constants have been
selected so that φ¯(a, b, c) = pφ¯(a + 1, b, c) + (1 − p)(φ¯(a, b + 1, c) − gˆ⋆) and φ¯(b + 1, b, c) =
b+ 1 + c · w − gˆ⋆ = φ(b+ 1, b, c), for gˆ⋆ = p + p(1 − p)w which is the honest gain. Doing this,
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we can use known results about φ for smaller states while having a tight enough closed form of
φˆ on states which are unlikely to be reached.
Following the notation of [8] we define φ¯M for when Miner 1 continues to mine, φ¯R when
Miner 1 releases some blocks and φ¯C when he capitulates.
φ¯M (a, b, c) = p · φ¯(a+ 1, b, c) + (1− p)(φ¯(a, b+ 1, c) − gˆ
⋆)
φ¯R(a, b, c) = φ¯(a− b− 1, 0, 0) + b+ 1 + c · w − gˆ
⋆
φ¯C(a, b, c) = max
s=0,...,b−1
φ¯(0, s, 1).
Theorem 3. For every p < 0.344, there exists w ≥ 0 large enough so that if every miner
but one follows Frontier(w), the best response of the remaining miner with hash power p is
Frontier.
Proof. We need to show that φ¯ is a valid potential and satisfies (14) for gˆ⋆ = p+ p(1− p)w, or
equivalently:
φ¯(a, b, c) = max{φ¯M (a, b, c), φ¯R(a, b, c), φ¯C (a, b, c)}
Lemma 5. The potential φ¯ and gˆ⋆ = p+ p(1− p)w satisfy recurrence (14) for p ≤ 0.344 (root
of the polynomial −p4 + 3p3 − 7p2 + 5p− 1) and some w < 1.
Proof.
Claim 1. For states (a, b, c) with a < b+ 1:
φ¯(a, b, c) = φ(a, b, c) = max{φ¯M (a, b, c), φ¯R(a, b, c), φ¯C (a, b, c)}.
In this case φ¯R(a, b, c) = −∞ and therefore φ¯(a, b, c) = φ(a, b, c) which satisfies (12) and
(14) by definition, as releasing is only possible for a ≥ b+ 1.
Claim 2. For states (a, b, c) with a > b+ 1:
φ¯(a, b, c) = φ¯M (a, b, c) = max{φ¯M (a, b, c), φ¯R(a, b, c), φ¯C (a, b, c)}.
By definition, φ¯(a, b, c) = φ¯M (a, b, c). We have:
φ¯(a, b, c) − φ¯R(a, b, c) =
b(2− 4p) + (1− p)(2− 3p)(1− pw)
1− 2p
> 0.
Since p ≤ 0.344 we know that φ(a, b, c) corresponds to the potential of the honest mining
strategy, in the immediate release case. Therefore:
φ¯C(a, b, c) = max
s=0,...,b−1
φ¯(0, s, 1)
= max
s=0,...,b−1
φ(0, s, 1) = φ(0, 0, 1) ≤ w ·
p
1− p
as (0, 0, 1) and (0, 0, 0) are the only mining states and by using Lemma 4 for the last inequality.
Also:
φ¯R(a, b, c) = φ¯(a− b− 1, 0, 0) + b+ 1 + c · w − gˆ
⋆
≥ 1− p(1− p)w
≥ w ·
p
1− p
≥ φ¯C(a, b, c),
for p < 0.344.
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Claim 3. For states (b+ 1, b, c):
φ¯(b+ 1,b, c) = φ¯R(b+ 1, b, c)
= max{φ¯M (b+ 1, b, c), φ¯M (b+ 1, b, c), φ¯C (b+ 1, b, c)}.
Exactly as before, we have φ¯R(b+1, b, c) = b+1+c·w−gˆ
⋆ ≥ φ¯C(b+1, b, c). For φ¯M (b+1, b, c):
φ¯M (b+ 1, b, c) = pφ¯(b+ 2, b, c) + (1− p)
(
φ¯(b+ 1, b+ 1, c) − g
)
≤ p((b+ 2)λ+ bµ+ κ+ c · w)
+ (1− p)
(
(b+ 1 + c · w)
p
1 − p
− g
)
,
by the definition of φ¯ and Lemma 4. Then:
φ¯R(a, b, c) − φ¯M (a, b, c) ≥
b(1 − 2p)2 + (p− 1)
(
p3w − p2(w + 1) + p(2c · w + 5)− c · w
)
+ 1.
Since b ≥ 0 we only need:
(p− 1)
(
p3w − p2(w + 1) + p(2c · w + 5)− c · w
)
+ 1 ≥ 0.
Setting w = 1, it holds for p ≤ 0.344 for c = 0 and p ≤ 0.442 for c = 1. For smaller values of p
it is not necessary to set w to it’s highest value.
Now, we can use the equivalent of Lemma 3(whose proof has very minor differences) for the
strategic release case to get that:
gˆ⋆ = lim
k→∞
gˆk(a, b, c)
k
≤ lim
k→∞
φ¯(a, b, c) + k · (p+ p(1− p)w)
k
= p+ p(1− p)w.
This shows that his gain is at most what he would get by playing Frontier, hence a best
response.
Through a procedure similar to Section 3.1, adjusting the LP for this case, we obtain the
following graph for d = 8 for the minimum value of w required.
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Figure 9: Minimum values of w for the strategic release case.
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Contrary to Figure 7, for p = 0.385 we have w ≈ 1. As d→∞, we reach w = 1 for p ≈ 0.38.
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